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In the recent political crisis in Iran that followed the contested presidential elections 
of 12 June, 2009, BBC Persian television (henceforth BBCPTV) that had started in 
January that year was singled out by the regime in Tehran as one of the main causes 
for blame.  
  
The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (in a speech on 19 June) called Britain 
the “most malicious” of western powers.  He said that Britain had tried to instigate 
demonstrations and create political crisis through the use of the BBC. The next day 
supporters of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who had claimed victory in the election, 
poured out in the streets carrying banners saying: “BBC Persian, against our popular 
government”. They demanded that the BBC office and the British embassy in Tehran 
should both be closed down. BBCPTV has not been allowed to establish a bureau in 
Tehran since its start in January 2009, but the BBC correspondent in Tehran, Jon 
Leyne, and BBC’s World Affairs Editor, John Simpson, were both told to leave Iran 
immediately.  In the following days the exchange of expulsions of diplomats (two 
each) and the arrest of 19 Iranian staff members of the British embassy in Tehran 
ensued.  Later in August the chief political analyst in the British embassy was taken to 
a political court accused of spying for Britain and, through forced confessions, he was 
made to apologize. 
  
The London mayor, Boris Johnson, writing in the web comment page of the 
Telegraph 22 June posed the question, “Can the Ayatollah possibly be right?” and 
then answered: 
  
“Well, yes he is, partly, in the sense that the BBC's Persian service has had a big 
influence on the demonstrations, supplying the kind of critical and impartial 
commentary that the regime would never normally allow. This ayatollah's curse is a 
vindication of the BBC, and the principle of taxpayer-funded broadcasting.” 
  
This was not the first time that the BBC Persian Services have been singled out for 
blame by Iran. Ayatollah Khamenei, a member of the Islamic opposition during the 
reign of the former Shah of Iran, must remember that during the Iranian revolution of 
1979, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi also blamed BBC Persian – then only a radio service 
- for instigating the revolution. BBC Persian Service radio, (henceforth BBCPR) 
funded by the Foreign Office, reported on the opposition movement that was growing 
against the Shah, who found it impossible to believe that the British Government 
could not control the BBC and thus must favour the formation of an Islamic state. 
Accused by some of actually fomenting protest, the BBC has long maintained its 
objectivity and neutrality in the face of various pressures, in 1979 and in 2009 alike.  
  
In January 2009, the Foreign Office released - under the thirty year rule - many 
documents pertaining to the last year of the revolution. They, and other documents in 
the BBC Written Archive, allow for a serious scrutiny of the complicated relationship 
between the FO and the BBC in relation to Iran.[1] This analysis might lay to rest 
some of the more elaborate but erroneous imaginings about the role of the BBC, 
although the most extreme of Iranian conspiratorial imaginings are rarely dampened 
by lack of evidence.  While BBCPS, as all of the World Service, is financed by the 
Foreign Office as part of British long-term strategic goals in the region, BBC 
journalism did not always go the way the Foreign Office might have preferred. Indeed, 
there is considerable evidence that the BBC didn’t always play the paymaster’s tune. 
This paper explores this delicate dance between the FCO and the BBCPS over this 
tumultuous year and analyses the impact it had, and has, on the relations between Iran 
and Britain.   
  
BBC Persian radio and the mobilization of 1978-9 
  
In the early 1970s, the Shah was regarded internationally as an unrivalled and 
ambitious dictator, as a devoted ally of the US and as enjoying excellent relations 
with the international community. Iran was seen as enjoying prosperity and economic 
growth as the Shah staged the extravagant celebrations of the 2500 anniversary of the 
Iranian monarchy at Persepolis in 1971. To avert political change, he himself 
introduced the so called “White Revolution”, an ambitious program of land reform, 
and set up his own political party, Rastakhiz, which had compulsory membership and 
dues,. Both of these created tension and dissent. During the late 1960s the Shah had 
become increasingly dependent on the secret police (SAVAK) in controlling those 
opposition movements critical of his reforms. The combination of SAVAK 
monitoring internal dissent and a vast army equipped with ultramodern weapons 
looking outwards, in the mid-1970s the Shah’s regime appeared durable.  Despite 
endemic corruption and complex economic problems it was appeared that the regime 
was indestructible.   
  
However, movements against the Shah were gathering momentum inside Iran and 
amongst Iranians abroad. These included armed uprisings and underground 
movements inside Iran as well as the movements of the disenchanted clergy and the 
liberal nationalist movement, the National Front. The International Confederation of 
Iranian Students in Europe and the US often organized successful demonstrations 
during the Shah’s visits abroad to unmask his claim to popularity. At the same time 
the gradual rise in the price of oil through the 1970s led by the Shah through the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) angered the West while the 
parlous state of human rights began to gain international attention.   
  
But suddenly the Shah’s fortunes changed in just over two years A string of 
demonstrations, strikes and mass protests at home and protests abroad gained 
international attention. The BBC Persian Service, hitherto regarded as unimportant, 
rose to prominence during 1977-79. Iranians had become avid listeners and especially 
in from 1977-8, the BBC was no longer the limited domain of intellectuals and the 
upper classes. People from different backgrounds listened to the BBC as well as other 
radio channels available on short-wave, which were useful counterweights to the 
state-run radio and television network in Iran. BBCPS broadcasts became a trusted 
medium for news and information by Iranians at home and in the diasporas, mainly 
because it was the medium where the voices of opposition could be frequently heard.   
  
BBCPS after 1977 
  
Thus during 1977-8 the BBC became a major thorn in British relations with Iran.  The 
Shah eventually described the BBC as his “number one enemy”.[2] Through his 
meetings with the British Ambassador in Tehran, Anthony Parsons, through messages 
carried by the Iranian Ambassador in London, Parviz Radji, and by sending several 
high level delegations - including his sister Princess Ashraf - from Tehran to London, 
the Shah made his complaint about the BBC heard by Downing Street and the FCO.   
  
Sir Anthony Parsons, the British Ambassador in Tehran, wrote regularly to the FCO 
about the Shah’s complaints, going as far as to question the viability of the BBC if it 
was having such an adverse effect on British relations with one of its most trusted 
allies. In fact as early as August 1976 Parsons began warning the British Government 
that British interests should dictate British policies and “we only succeed in damaging 
these interests if we adopt public attitudes which are at variance with our policies.”[3] 
Most reports from Parsons reveal that he supported the Shah, viewed the BBC as 
having little real influence in Iran and as such, considered it relatively unimportant for 
effecting British foreign policy. He regards the Persian Service of the BBC as “very 
largely a waste of time and money” and that he scarcely meets any Persians who 
listen to it and if they do, they regard it with suspicion.  Parsons repeats his disbelief 
that the Persian Service “does a positive service to British interests in Iran.”[4] 
  
The FCO challenged Parson’s position. Nicholas Barrington from the Guidance and 
Information Department at FCO wrote back “I hope you don’t mind my saying that I 
was slightly surprised by the strength and monolithic nature of your views”.  He 
argued that the BBC would see in them an example of “the FCO’s concern with short 
term expediency which they find inhibiting to much longer term aims.”[5] Barrington 
explained that the rationale behind foreign language broadcasting was “to operate in 
the medium and long term, influencing those who may one day form an alternative 
government”. He asks, “is there not some national interest” in making the Iranians 
“accustomed and sympathetic to Western democratic traditions, particularly when the 
opposition has no local voice?”[6] 
  
But there were clear differences of approach within the FCO. A “confidential” 
account of the minutes of the BBC Board of Governors meeting held in July 1976 
confirms that, for the first time, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was actually 
considering abolishing the Persian Section due to mounting pressure from Iran: 
  
“The Shah’s objections had led to exchanges between the British Ambassador 
in Tehran and the FCO, as a result of which the FCO had set up a small 
official working party to see whether the Persian Service should be altered or 
abolished.  This was the first time in               the Director-General’s 
experience that the FCO had seemed prepared to consider altering or 
abolishing a language service because it was causing embarrassment.”[7] 
  
The working party was set up officially to consider whether the Persian Service 
“should be altered in any way or abolished altogether.’[8] On 15 July 1976, M, 
Kendall of the Guidance and Information Department at the FCO, who was asked to 
conduct the review, wrote to the BBC’s head of Eastern Service, Mark Dodd, spelling 
out the terms of reference for the review of the service: “To examine the benefit to the 
[British] national interest of the Persian Service of the BBC as an instrument in the 
overseas information program and to make recommendations for its continuation, 
modification or abolition”.[9] 
  
In submitting the Terms Of Reference, the FCO clarifies that the use of “national 
interest” had been taken deliberately from the License and Agreement, since that and 
no other document expressed the BBC’s “constitutional requirements”.[10] The 
License And Agreement was written on 7 July 1969 and has as its final phrase the 
reference to “national interest”: 
  
“The Corporation shall consult and collaborate with the Department so 
specified and shall obtain and accept from them such information regarding 
conditions in, and the policies of HMG aforesaid towards, the countries so 
prescribed and other countries as will enable the Corporation to plan and 
prepare its programs in the External Services in the national interest.”[11] 
  
Put simply, BBC external services should consult with the relevant FCO department 
on matters that could affect British national interests.  
  
However, the BBC was also pushing for its own expertise in design and production of 
its programmes. When the review of the Persian Service by Anthony Parsons was sent 
to Mark Dodd in 1976, he hit back with anger saying that “assaults” on the Persian 
Service from the British Embassy in Tehran were “nothing new”.  Dodd said that he 
was at a loss to know what Sir Anthony meant by the ‘Persian Service tends to be 
regarded as propaganda’, and asks ‘propaganda for whom?’ Dodd then criticizes the 
ambassador directly: 
  
“The term in which Parsons discusses the BBC’s role suggests that he has no 
understanding or appreciation of the nature of broadcasting.  He seems to 
measure its effectiveness as, in the first place, an agency source for 
newspapers and in the second, by its ability to reach a very narrowly defined 
elite… It must be evident to the FCO that the sort of Persian Service which 
Parsons advocates would be a nonsense.” [12] 
  
Parsons was advocating a Persian Service that would report mainly on business and 
trade and not become too involved in politics while Dodd argued,  “commercially 
orientated programmes can only live within the structure of an overall Service”. He 
argued that without the news and current affairs he doubted if anyone would listen to 
Bazaar-O-Bourse, the business news programme of the Service. [13] 
  
This spat seems to have followed a visit to London in June 1976 by Princess 
Ashraf.  Ashraf, the twin of the Shah, was the most powerful member of his family 
and had a ten-minute “private conversation” with then Prime Minister Callaghan. 
Ahsraf brought a message of “continuing concern” from the Shah about “the attitude 
of the press and the BBC towards Iran”. Callaghan actually agreed in the meeting that 
the coverage of Iran had been “deplorable” but said there was very little he could do 
to influence the British press. Ashraf asked whether it was not the case that the BBC 
was “owned” by the Government and expressed great surprise that it could not be 
controlled, a position that doubtless resonates with the Iranian understanding in 2009. 
The PM explained that the relationship with the BBC oversees services was a 
“complicated” one but the extent of Government influence was “very strictly 
limited”.[14] 
  
After several reviews of the Persian Service by the designated board, H.D. Lancashire 
compiled the final results in November 1977.[15] Here the issues that had been raised 
over the past two years were tackled so as to spell out what the role of the BBC’s 
language services in general and the Persian Service in particular were in securing 
long- term British interests around the world. The paper quotes from a lecture by 
Gerard Mansell, the Managing Director of the BBC External Service, that the answer 
to questions about the future of BBC external broadcasting must rest not just on issues 
of “narrowly conceived self interest” but more to the importance Britain attaches to 
the “free movement of ideas, and the world-wide dissemination of truth”.  The review 
panel concluded that the BBC could retain its standing and repute only by retaining its 
“credibility” with listeners. That credibility “rests on accurate and unbiased news and 
fair and consistent analysis and comment.”[16] 
  
Clearly the review panel believed that any short-term interests were of lesser 
importance than such a long-term view. It argued that Iran was a “country of 
considerable strategic importance”, that the Shah was not going to be its only ruler 
and that Britain must consider the variety of views to be found in Iran. It accepted that 
under the circumstances it was inevitable that the truth might irritate the Shah and 
cause trouble for the ambassador but stipulated that the long-term effects of the BBC 
should not be compromised.[17] The review panel took account of all the points made 
by ambassador Parsons about “our bilateral relationships” but came to the conclusion 
that “the longer term power for influence of the BBC is a valuable asset which should 
not be surrendered so long as funds are available to continue it.”[18]               
  
This review made a powerful defence of the importance of the BBC around the world 
in conveying British values and the acknowledgement that its credibility was based on 
providing a truthful account of events, and became the blueprint for the defence of 
BBC’s independence. It rejected Parson’s call for closure or reduction of the 
Service.  However, it did not mean that the FCO did not have the right to express 
concerns when the British “national interest” was threatened. 
  
On 24 January 1978, ambassador Parsons had an audience with the Shah about the 
BBC and had to explain the Government’s “limitations in influencing the BBC and 
the damage which would be done if we crossed this line.” The Shah remained 
unimpressed and accused the British Government of having no interest in Iran “except 
in terms of making money”. The Shah complained that ministers used to say nice 
things to him in private but “it was a long time since anyone had the courage to say 
the same things in public” and finished asking Parsons to tell London that “BBC had 
brought us to the limit” and that if things did not get any better “it would be 
impossible for our relationship to remain undamaged”.[19]  Such was the imagined 
power of BBC broadcasts that the Shah related them directly to the continued UK 
relations with Iran.  
  
These strong feelings were fed back to London and the FCO in turn asked Parsons to 
convey to the Shah that his complaints had been taken up with the BBC. Several 
meetings took place between the FCO, the BBC and the Iranian ambassador in 
London, while the official British policy was that it was best for the Iranian 
ambassador to raise the complaints directly with the BBC. 
  
The then Iranian Ambassador in London, Parviz Radji (1983) catalogues the various 
meetings between himself and Gerald Mansell, Managing Director of BBC External 
Services, as well as with Ian Trethowan, the Director General of BBC, and Mark 
Dodd, Head of BBC’s Eastern Service.  It is clear from these accounts that the Shah 
was cabling frequently his anger at BBC Persian Service.[20] 
  
The Iranian press also was monitoring BBCPS output and picking up on its 
language.  On 15 December 1977 Keyhan International published a list of what it 
ridiculed as BBC-esque reporting and concluded that what the BBC does cannot be 
considered “accidental” since the department is under the “direct supervision” of the 
British Foreign Office. It wonders why, when the two governments are friendly, “the 
BBC is actively propagating violence in our country”.[21] By the end of January 1978 
Iran filed a set of specific complaints.  These included various BBC TV programmes 
as well as David Dimbleby’s interview with President Carter in which he accused Iran 
of human rights violations, Andrew Whitley’s report for the Financial Times, and 
human rights reports by Amnesty International.  However, BBC Persian Service 
remained the main culprit.  
  
Matters became more serious as the Persian broadcasts of the BBC become more 
popular in Iran over the following months. Questions were raised as to why the 
Persian Service that had been relatively unimportant in the 1960s and early 1970s had 
suddenly became the main source of information on developments inside Iran and 
amongst the exiled opposition? Persian Service’s senior programme assistant, Lutfali 
Khonji, pointed out in a recent interview that there was no conspiracy in the reporting 
but simply that so much was happening: 
  
“At this stage there was a lot to report since the opposition was gathering 
momentum and they were contacting us in the BBC with news. It was not just 
the Islamic activists but also the National Front and left activists of a variety 
of colours. They would call us daily giving us details of demonstrations, 
gatherings and their political statements. So we had a lot to report.”[22] 
  
Other British voices started to raise questions about the role of the BBC. David 
Ransom, writing in the Daily Telegraph, asserted that the BBC Persian Service has 
been “infiltrated by anti-Shah elements”.  But the Managing Director of BBC 
External Broadcasting, Gerard Mansell, immediately and strongly refuted this, 
accusing the Daily Telegraph of publishing views that are “wholly without 
foundation”. Referring to several such opinions previously published in the paper he 
said that they were merely “repeating malicious accusations made over the weeks and 
months by those who have an interest in the news being manipulated for political 
ends.” He defended the staff in the Persian Service as constituting a team of “high 
quality” with “impeccable professionalism” who had at no time given grounds for 
suspecting their integrity despite “the pressures to which they, too, have been 
exposed”[23] 
  
Mansell wrote a similar letter to Peter Temple Morris MP, who had received 
complaints about a member of the BBCPS staff, giving details of the background and 
education of the staff in the Persian Service. Mansell notes that nine programme 
assistants in the Service have “outstanding academic qualifications” with one holding 
a “PhD in linguistics from London University”.[24] There are similar letters from the 
Persian Programme Organizer, John Dunn, and other internal BBC exchanges 
responding to complaints, evidence of a strong campaign against the BBCPS.[25] 
  
There are also several exchanges between the FCO and the BBC about Persian 
Service broadcasters. The Iranian Government was accusing them of giving only “the 
opposition side of the story”, inviting the public to unrest and thus giving “little 
importance to a balanced account of events”.[26] Lutfali Khonji believes that this may 
have been the impression that was given but the reality was that a revolutionary 
movement was growing and everyone, including the staff of the Persian Service, had 
become far more involved in politics.  Political activists without access to media in 
Iran were contacting the BBC with news.  According to Khonji, this was engaging: 
  
“Those working in the BBC had their own set of contacts.  Some had close 
contacts with Islamic scholars and activists and I was the main link for the 
National Front and as such my friends would pass on the relevant news on 
developments. Improved communications techniques meant that the BBC 
could be heard far better in Europe … and the Iranian Diaspora were 
increasingly involved in the struggle for democracy in Iran. Another element 
that increased news coverage was that the BBC dispatched several reporters 
to Iran and thus could report from various corners of the country on 
developments. That meant the volume of incoming news was suddenly 
drastically increased. New methods of broadcasting such as interviews were 
allowed.”[27] 
  
Another Persian broadcaster, Baqer Moin, acknowledged recently on Radio Four’s 
Document programme that he had been pro revolution.  However, he added that BBC 
guidelines did not allow any of the broadcasters to bring their political opinions into 
their reporting.  Moin, who became the head of Persian Service in 1990, said that 
during the period of revolution there was little any individual broadcaster could do 
since most news and reports were prepared in the newsroom and was translated and 
read by broadcasters.[28] 
  
Several reviews of the Persian service suggest that this is an accurate description of 
the process. Most found only small criticism in the production and delivery of news. 
One of the letters from the embassy in Tehran to the Middle East Department of FCO 
gave a example: 
  
“After giving Whitley’s account of recent public meetings… they added, 
quite gratuitously it seems to us, a Reuters item to the effect that in a recent 
wrestling tournament the Iranian spectators had shouted ‘Yankee Go Home’ 
at the American team whereas there had been much support for the Russian 
team. This had clearly been added by the editorial staff in London and was 
not attributable to Whitley.”[29] 
  
This shows how sensitive British officials had become to BBC reports and how they 
would scrutinize the smallest detail, often to do with translation of words.   In another 
letter, Lucas of the Middle East Department at FCO accepted that “Persians are 
characteristically over-reacting” but wondered whether if it was “to the benefit of the 
BBC” to be putting out a commentary. He suggested that, under the circumstances, 
the BBC could argue that it was an asset in the British relationship with Iran, “but it is 
clearly a liability when it assumes the role of commentator as distinct from reporter”.  
  
It was not just the Iranians that were critical of the Persian broadcasts. On his regular 
Thursday evening broadcasts on Capital Radio, Lord George Brown criticized the 
“BBC Overseas Services” for “broadcasting Ayatollah Khomeini’s instructions to the 
people.” He said he regarded this as a very “improper” use of “a publicly funded 
station.” He drew a distinction between what he termed “the coloured work done in 
the basement cellars in BBC Bush House” where they “interfere in other people’s 
politics”, in comparison to the “excellent news programmes which go out in English”, 
putting his finger on the distinction between external and internal services while 
refusing to acknowledge any framing of the world by and in the latter.[30] Gerard 
Mansell of the BBC responded with equal force: “I am going to be equally forthright 
and say that this is utter rubbish. Indeed I am surprised that Lord George Brown 
should have allowed himself to lend his name to denigration of this kind.”  Mansell 
believed that Brown had “his ear bent by people who had interest in doing so” and 
wondered why he hadn’t “checked his facts” with the BBC, inviting Brown to listen 
to “all the recordings of our Persian Service output”. He said that, like all other BBC 
overseas service, the Persian Service existed “to serve the national interests and I 
firmly believe it does just that.” Gerard Mansell’s strong defence of the performance 
of the Persian Service, which was published in Broadcast, the internal BBC magazine, 
concluded: “all this about the BBC Persian Service helping to destabilize Iran on 
behalf of that elderly exile, the Ayatollah Khomeini, is of course nonsense.”[31]   
  
During this period, the BBC correspondent in Tehran, Andrew Whitley, was under 
constant pressure. He was instructed by British and Iranian officials alike how he 
should go about his journalism.  The Iranian information minister, Dariush Homayoun, 
told him that his first responsibility as a BBC journalist was “to contribute towards 
greater Irano-British understanding” and that he should always “be careful to see 
news against this wider background”, to which Whitley replied that perhaps Iran’s 
officials should provide more information so reporters didn’t have to always talk to 
the opposition.[32] In a separate letter Whitley illustrates how he always had to 
explain his reports to British officials too: 
  
“After Buckmaster’s telephone call I discussed the situation with the Acting 
Head of Eastern Service who arranged for me to call at the FCO in the 
afternoon to present our case and the relevant documents to him. Another 
senior official also attended the meeting – I believe named Mike Carver. It 
was cordial, though it was made quite clear to me how seriously the FCO 
regard the complaint and the Ambassador’s telegram.  Our right to broadcast 
the dispatch in Persian was accepted and I believe understood. Buckmaster 
suggested we could have avoided giving offence by omitting reference to...” 
[33] 
  
The fact that Whitley had to meet up so many times with the FCO to “explain” and 
that the FCO officials would recommend that certain phrases could have been 
“omitted” indicates that direct demands were being made on the details of 
broadcasting by the FCO. From the correspondence it also appears that some form of 
verbal agreement was been reached in the meetings between the BBC and the FCO 
over matters relating to the national interest, although this is kept highly confidential. 
In a letter marked “personal and confidential”, written on 19 April 1978, JHG Leahy 
of the FCO reminds the BBC Managing Director, Gerard Mansell of an agreement: 
  
“You and I agreed the other day that there might be occasions when it would be right 
for me to send you papers which were intended for your eyes only…I should of 
course be happy to come and discuss with you… ways for establishing closer 
supervision of the Persian Service, and if possible, reducing its commentaries on 
Iranian internal affairs to, say, five minutes at a time?” [34] 
  
While such FCO comment on content and language was comparatively light-tough, 
there is also evidence that in 1978 it also tried to interfere in the BBC recruitment 
process of reporters working on Iran.  In several exchanges, the FCO expressed 
dismay at the BBC’s appointment of a Mr. Branigan from the Washington Post and 
also considered it unacceptable that Liz Thurgood of the Guardian should replace 
Andrew Whitley while he went on leave. The basic argument made was that the Shah 
of Iran has strongly objected to reports by both and they are “heartily 
disliked”.[35]                 
  
The Iranian attack on the BBC was fairly relentless. In December 1978, just a couple 
of months before the revolution, Ambassador Radji wrote to Sir Michael Swann, 
chairman of the BBC Board of Governors, accusing the Persian Section of “a 
positively hostile attitude towards Iran during the past two years.” He claimed that the 
Section pursued “methods of journalistic manipulation” and “doctoring of the news”, 
adding that the BBC was careful “to cover its tracks in a strictly legal sense by 
creating an aura of supposed objectivity”, which could have been an interesting 
critique of BBC practice were it not so petulantly made. To illustrate his point he said 
that the BBC Home service, World Service and television all reported the ending of 
oil strikes in the south of Iran but the Persian section refused to do so and instead 
carried another item that spoke of the continuation of the strike.  He also argued that 
the Persian Section “consistently” used sources that were “hostile to the Iranian 
regime.”[36] 
  
One of the common assertions amongst pro-Shah Iranians is that the BBC was always 
ahead of the news in Iran, especially that the BBC would announce upcoming 
demonstrations before they were announced in Iran.  This comes up in the letter of 
complaint from Ambassador Radji who accuses the Section of violating “journalistic 
ethics”:   
               
“No responsible radio or newspaper carries news of wild-cat strikes in 
advance. But the Section does so as a matter of policy. For a whole week it 
tells its listeners that a strike will be observed on a specific day.”[37] 
  
He goes on to say that the Section ignores “the fact that the Khomeini-led part of the 
opposition” is for the overthrow of the regime and thus “illegal”. Radji compared the 
coverage to the BBC regularly interviewing the IRA or the British Anarchist Party, 
said that he had never seen the British media publicizing in advance demonstrations 
by the IRA and thus accused the BBC of “double standards”.[38] Radji concluded that 
the BBC followed a policy of “deliberate hostility towards Iran” with the effect of 
“subversion of Iran’s legally constituted Government and systematic encouragement 
of violence.”[39] That the revolutionary system brought in to Iran by these events 
should thirty years later, after a summer of discontent, accuse the BBC of the very 
same thing is an irony not lost on those who worked in the BBC then and now 
  
The same idea was echoed by the Iranian newspaper Keyhan International, accused 
the BBC of “actively propagating violence in our country”.[40]  Although Parsons 
described this as a “virulent” attack on the BBC, he considered the main objection by 
the Shah was to “the extensive and over sympathetic coverage given to the dissidents 
and students” and a refusal to report “improvements” in human rights in the year prior 
to the revolution. He also felt he could and should intervene directly by speaking to 
the BBC reporter in Tehran, Andrew Whitley, and to the BBC Eastern Service 
controller, Stride:  
  
“I told them that although I considered it none of my business what they 
choose to report, they should know just how unpopular the BBC was now 
with the Shah.  I told them that if the clock were turned back four years to 
when Bierman was expelled, Whitley would have been out of the country by 
now. Whitley accepted that he had filed a few dispatches that had been 
critical of the Government’s role in the disturbances but said he had also 
recently filed a number of favourable stories, e.g. about a state visit to 
Oman.”[41] 
  
The ambassador’s veiled threats echoed those of Iranian officials.  In a letter to the 
FCO, Parsons enclosed an “aide memoir” from the Foreign Ministry in Iran which ran: 
“In spite of repeated warnings” to the British Government in recent months covering 
“the malicious policy of the BBC Farsi programme … no changes have unfortunately 
been made in the policy.” Considering that the corporation is not a private 
organization and that the British Government provides its budget, “the excuse that the 
BBC is independent of the Government” is “unacceptable”. It argues that the BBC 
seems to be a “propaganda instrument for those groups whose aim is to encourage 
people to revolt against the legally established regime of Iran” and this is “against the 
mutual interests of the two nations”. Two main cases were identified.  One is a report 
by Baqer Moin in the main flagship program Jame Jahan Nama and the other is an 
interview with Ayatollah Khomeini that was broadcast in the same program.  The 
report found objectionable was translated by the embassy in Teheran and attached: 
  
“Religious and political leaders of Iran have requested that tomorrow, 
Sunday, be announced as a protest and mourning day.  A BBC 
reporter in Tehran says in his report: the speaker of one of the 
important religious leaders in Mashad said that people demonstrated 
inside the Shrine of Imam Reza which is the holiest religious place for 
the Shiite followers of the world. He said soldiers attacked and shot 
them with automatic rifles. Two religious leaders of Mashad, who are 
amongst the most prominent sources of the Shiite sect, Ayatollah 
Shirazi and Ayatollah Ghomi issued communiqués in which they 
protested against the shooting… and urged a one day national 
mourning on Sunday. Today Ayatollah Khomeini requested that a 
one-day strike be made as a gesture instead. Meanwhile several other 
religious leaders in Tehran asked for a one-day mourning which 
practically means a strike. Ayatollah Khomeini‘s communiqué 
coincided with the National Front communiqué. The National Front in 
its communiqué, which is very proactive, says the Government has 
shown its anti-Islamic face.” [42]   
  
This report is somewhat different to the usual style of BBC reporting. The name of the 
BBC reporter in Tehran is not given, so it is difficult to know whether this was 
Andrew Whitley’s piece translated by the Service or written by Baqer Moin. It also 
does not say to whom the comments from the ayatollahs were addressed, nor whether 
by interview or in a statement? It says “several religious leaders” had said the same 
thing, without naming or quoting them.  This report – if it is translated accurately—
does appear more editorialized than usual BBC reports and many BBC editors may 
not feel have been happy about broadcasting in that tone.   
  
The issue continued to buzz and some MPs became quite agitated about the role of 
BBCPOS. In a controversial interview with BBC’s World at One, Lord George 
Brown again distinguished the BBC World Service in English from the language 
Services and targeted the émigré broadcasters as the source of the problem, rather 
than those on the ground in Tehran: 
  
“You have the separate band – separate broadcasts – in the languages of the 
people in the country which deal with the political issues… which is staffed 
by -- necessarily so – émigrés, refugees from those countries who are hostile 
to the regime of the country; that is why they are émigrés in the first place. 
They are operating in a way that expresses their views, their desires, which 
may or may not fit with the policy of the Government of this country. And 
because the BBC is funded by the Government – and everyone overseas 
knows this – it is assumed that this is British Government policy.”  
  
In the Daily Telegraph in December 1978 Julian Amery MP picked up the same 
theme, arguing that “the young radicals have achieved an effective penetration of the 
Iranian Service of the BBC”.  Brown made an even stronger accusation, saying the 
that the “Farsi service run by émigré Iranians” was not only “putting out anti-shah 
propaganda”, but it was putting out “heavily pro-Khomeini propaganda”, neither of 
which - according to him  - was the Government policy. Brown claimed that “one of 
his (Khomeini) associates on the staff of BBC Overseas Service put out a call to the 
people of Tehran to riot, to go to the streets” and “that was going beyond reporting 
news”.  He called for a “parliamentary inquiry” to determine “that this very thin line 
between propaganda and news, between propaganda and truth, was not 
overstepped.”[43]   
  
Mansell, Managing Director of BBC External Broadcasting was furious and 
adamantly refuted the charge, saying that the external services of the BBC “do not 
transmit propaganda, either in Persian or any other language”,   nor were they 
compliant in serving the cause of Shah’s exiled religious opponents or anyone else: 
  
“Over the period of May to October [1978] there were more than 450 
items on developments in Iran in our Persian Service news 
output.  Only six of those quoted the Ayatollah. Extracts from 
interviews given by the Ayatollah to the British TV and Radio were 
broadcast only once – and then for sound journalistic reasons.  They 
were hardly calculated to foment civil strife but any Iranian can buy 
cassettes recordings of the ayatollah’s outpourings in the 
Bazaar.  These are nothing to do with the BBC.”[44] 
  
Thirty years on, Baqer Moin interviewed for the Radio 4 “Document” programme 
said that like many other Iranians he was not pro-Shah but more in favour of the rule 
of law, human rights and against censorship. “I wasn’t in favour of the shah but I 
never campaigned in any sense,” says Baqer Moin.  “The BBC was really very careful 
not to have anybody active in politics to be participating in the programmes of the 
Persian Service.” However, when pressed, he said he was “pro-revolution like many 
others in the country.” 
  
There were also examples given by BBC staff that suggested an opposite dynamic to 
that  described by Brown. The following example, relating to a highly controversial 
interview with Ayatollah Khomeini that coincided with the second complaint made by 
the Iranian Government, comes from Lutfali Khonji as a personal story. Khonji said 
that when, with great difficulty, he managed to get an appointment to interview the 
Ayatollah he was blocked by the BBC’s head of Eastern Service, Mark Dodd. Khonji 
says 
  
“At the time interviewing was done with great technical difficulty.  We had to 
book studios and lines. I also had to speak to several contacts before 
convincing them of the justifications for the interview. Nevertheless, soon 
after arriving in the studio, Mark Dodd, the head of BBC WS, arrived in the 
studio. I don’t even know who had informed him that I was doing this 
interview. He barred me from interviewing and said we should not 
“artificially blow the events out of proportion.”[45] 
  
Khonji uses this as an example to reject the common belief that the BBC was 
supporting the Islamic revolution in Iran. However, FCO documents show that Mark 
Dodd’s assertion was made under pressure from the Iranian Embassy in London and 
Khonji recalls that after about three weeks, Mark Dodd did allow the interview with 
Khomeini. This famous single interview with Ayatollah Khomeini came under strong 
scrutiny later for failing to meet journalistic standards. 
  
The Foreign Office was seriously alarmed when Mark Dodd informed them about the 
plan to interview Khomeini. At the foreign policy meeting, serious concern was 
expressed. The minutes of the meeting record that “this was a development of such 
potential seriousness” that the FCO was “justified in taking the matter up with the 
BBC at a high level.” Leahy of the Middle East Department of the FCO said “I hope 
the BBC is not contemplating interviewing Khomeini…we have already gone as far 
as we should.” The main issue was about how to stop the BBC from broadcasting an 
interview with Khomeini. The directive from the Foreign Secretary, David Owen, was 
that the BBC should not be approached directly, Owen having repeatedly emphasized 
the importance of BBC’s independence in his correspondence. This was, however, 
always coupled with a word of caution that left room for making protests to the BBC. 
For example in his letter to Sir Michael of the BBC’s Board of Governors on 14 
December 1978 following the complaints, Owen says: 
  
“I am a strong believer in the independence of the BBC and the value 
of the BBC’s external broadcasts. I have therefore been scrupulous 
about defending your independence at all stages. I believe it would be 
gravely damaging to the long-term future of Britain’s standing in the 
world if there were to be an attempt of Government interference. I 
have, however, to assure myself that you and your board are fully 
aware of the criticisms from foreign governments and I feel it is my 
responsibility to satisfy myself that you have given the representations 
of foreign governments full consideration.”[46] 
  
Owen admits that the fact that the FCO finances the external services presents an 
problem but reiterates that he will tell the Iranian Foreign Minister in their meeting 
about BBC’s “editorial independence”.[47] Leahy reveals in his letter that there has 
been an agreement of some sort with the BBC, although he does not spell it out: 
  
“In terms of the agreement we with have with them [BBC] they are 
obliged to ‘obtain and accept’ such information regarding conditions 
in, and the policies of HM Government…as will enable the 
Corporation to plan and prepare its programmes in the external 
services in the national interest.” [48]   
  
Leahy doubted that the BBC would forego the interview with Khomeini and indeed, if 
they did, there was a risk that this itself would become known and then the FCO 
would be seen to be putting pressure on the BBC. A few days later, news of the 
Persian Service interview was confirmed, so despite their attempts the FCO had not 
managed to stop the broadcast. Weir in the FCO informed the Foreign Minister, 
David Owen, that he had tried too late and although he had delayed it, he had not 
managed to stop the interview.  But there were no calls to arms expressed in the 
interview: 
  
“I telephoned Mark Dodd who made enquiries and came back to say the BBC 
could find no such phrase in any of the broadcasts quoting Khomeini. He 
added that the Persian Service is not carrying any statements by 
Khomeini…The Khomeini interview was broadcast  later.”[49] 
  
Weir said the BBC was beginning to get the message about the serious potential 
repercussions of their broadcasts.” but added that “we will maintain our official policy 
of not putting pressure on the BBC”.[50] 
  
What had happened was that the Persian Service had contacted a close aid to 
Khomeini, Abolhasan Banisadr, who later became president of Iran.  They asked him 
to help set up an interview with Khomeini. The Ayatollah had rejected the idea, 
according to Banisadr, saying: “The BBC belongs to the British and it is not in my 
best interest to give them an interview”.  Banisadr said “I convinced him when I said 
all the other media you give interviews to are also foreign so what is the 
difference!”  Khomeini then accepted.[51] He had asked for questions to be faxed to 
him in Paris, which was done, although David Perman of the World Service who 
accompanied Ferydoon Jahed to conduct the interview did not know about this. 
Perman says that at the time this was not so important:   
  
“We know it is an important interview now with hindsight. At the time most 
of us did not even know what an Ayatollah was, we could not even imagine 
he would one day be the leader of Iran.  We wanted democracy for Iran. We 
went to this village outside Paris, went to his room and sat down cross-legged. 
He would have no eye contact with us. Areas of questioning were agreed with 
the Ayatollah. When I asked a question about the minorities, he answered it 
but then turned back to his aides who told us if there was any other unwritten 
question he would stop the interview immediately.  I did not know there were 
written questions.”[52] 
  
So was there any truth in the accusation that the interview appeared like propaganda 
or that the BBC oversaw the “coronation of the Ayatollah”? In the March 2009 radio 
documentary on this subject, Permian said the result was that “the Ayatollah did use it 
as a platform for his views” but   that  “was surprising and that it was not our intention 
to give him such a platform. …to that extent it was not a good interview, I wasn’t able 
to press him with supplementary questions.” On the other hand he thinks it was still “a 
good interview because it did show what we were facing.”[53]  Also looking back, 
Mark Dodd, the then head of the Eastern Service who was responsible for the content, 
thinks this was an “unsatisfactory” basis for conducting an interview but sees much 
journalistic value in getting the interview from a man who “himself was the story.” 
  
“What you could get out of him was going to illuminate the character of the 
man. You could make a case for the interview but I think it was flawed. Our 
coverage was not as full as we would have wished, there were mistakes, there 
were gaps, I am not for a moment saying this was an impeccable Service. 
There were occasions when we made mistakes, I am still sorry that we made 
those mistakes but they were infinitely less than our critics suggested.” [54] 
  
However, the military authorities in Iran continued to “regard the BBC Persian 
Service as contributing to “present security problems”, Parsons reported from 
Tehran.[55] The FCO itself began monitoring the Persian Service in London in 
December 1978 just two months before the Revolution. They wrote back to the 
embassy in Tehran saying that in none of the broadcasts they heard indicated any 
“false inflections”, there were no “obvious” examples of “slanting or distortion” and 
the overall content and presentation of material also seemed “quite well balanced”. 
They reported that there was, however, “some evidence of looseness of editorial 
supervision”, and “words were often translated in three or four different ways” but 
none of the words could be said to have been “stronger” in tone than the others.[56] 
  
In a letter analyzing the overall results of monitoring the Persian broadcasts, Rundle 
of the Research Department admitted that “perhaps inevitably”, with the opposition 
making the running in the last few weeks, “there has been more time spent on 
reporting opposition than Government activities” and that much of the reporting 
would “not have been to the liking of the Iranian authorities”.[57] 
  
Another report highlighted as being pro-opposition was a report in the 11 December 
1978 News: 
  
“Large crowds of people have again gathered in Tehran and other cities in 
Iran to take part in religious ceremonies and also in demonstrations against 
the Shah. It is estimated that the size of the crowd, going to Shahyad Square 
was even greater than the one million who were there yesterday. Our reporter 
says that the demonstrators were more militant than yesterday and the slogans 
were not only religious but made explicit attacks on the Shah himself and the 
Crown Prince, and many of them called for his death.  The BBC 
correspondent in Tehran said that for kilometres nothing could be seen but 
banners and flags… the religious leaders read aloud a declaration in support 
of their leader, Ayatollah Khomeini who is living in Paris…”[58] 
  
  
Was this truly a departure from BBC Persian Service’s style of reporting in the 
previous years or was it a reflection of the breath and depth of events happening in 
Iran? The broader question of impartiality of reporters at major historical conjunctures 
could be debated in relation to reporting during the weeks and months leading to the 
Iranian revolution. It is often the journalists themselves who carry the general tone of 
the news. At the time the recruitment criteria were different in the BBC World 
Service English and in the language services.  BBC English reporters were recruited 
after several tests on their reporting skills. Those in language services were recruited 
mainly on their translation skills. They were not even recruited as producers at that 
stage and were referred to as program assistants and translators. Consequently 
programme assistants did not have any control over the content and could not, or 
should not, have editorialized.  However, under the circumstances, the speed of 
incoming news and developments must have been confusing.  Editorial scrutiny may 
have been challenging.  Individual staff preferences could have contributed to the tone 
and selection of news items. 
  
Asked in a recent interview about the opinion of staff at the time, Khonji says it was a 
true reflection of Iranian society at home and abroad.  He claims about 80% of the 
staff supported the revolution and only 20% were against it. He says that the reason 
for the increased popularity of BBC could have been the better communication with 
the opposition as well as the fact that Radio Iran was on strike. BBC Persian Service 
staff also believe that the BBC itself had become far more open to newer methods of 
production.  Khonji and other members of staff interviewed, including Baqer Moin, 
Shahran Tabari and Solmaz Dabiri, all reject the assertion strongly that the British 
Government was pro the revolution or used the BBC for furthering that aim.  They 
say there was never any push or force on any member of the staff.  
  
However, Iranian supporters of the Shah continued to view the BBC’s role most 
sceptically.  In a revealing account of the Shah’s perception of events, he accuses the 
mass media of playing an important role in the unfolding of events in Iran during the 
last three years that led to the revolution. He said the composition of journalists in 
search of “ever more sensational news led to the most regrettable excesses.”[59] The 
Shah goes on to blame the BBC:  
  
“No less surprising was the BBC’s attitude.  From the beginning of 1978 their 
Persian language broadcasts consisted of virulent attacks against my 
regime.  It was as though some mysterious conductor had given the go ahead 
to these attacks.  I am not mentioning the attitude of certain special envoys 
that caused certain deplorable incidents to be magnified out of all 
proportion.  I am tempted to say that, for some newspapers a dead body is a 
godsend, and I think that some newsagents must have made a fortune out of 
the events in Iran.” [60] 
  
In his book, the then US Ambassador, William Sullivan, recalls how the Shah 
regularly complained about the BBC. He says that in August 1978, just a few months 
before the revolution and during the time of martial law, the Shah became especially 
suspicious and related BBC broadcasts to the question of oil negotiations between the 
UK and Iran and claimed they resembled “ancient British subversions” in Iran: 
  
“He [the Shah] pointed out the negotiations with the oil consortium were 
currently underway and that this gave the British antagonists all the excuses 
they needed to attempt the resumption of their ancient subversions in Iran.  In 
listening to the BBC broadcasts that were critical of his Government, he was, 
he said, confirmed in this analysis.” [61] 
  
Whatever the Shah and his supporters may have assumed, there was no intention on 
the part of the British Government to destabilize the Shah.  Foreign Office documents 
show clearly that the British Government saw in the Shah the most suitable leader for 
guarding British interests. It is only in September 1978 –five months before the 
revolution in Iran – that the British Government recognised the first signs of the 
possible downfall of the Shah. The Foreign Office and Downing Street were both 
“shocked” at the prospect. The FCO’s Middle East department began to assess 
possible scenarios and still came to the conclusion that “in the present climate of 
uncertainty prevailing in the region from Afghanistan to the Horn of Africa, the Shah 
is a vital bastion against Soviet encroachment with enormous threats which that 
presents to Western oil supplies and to our trade.” Lucas of the Middle East 
Department wrote to the Prime Minister that: 
  
“The shah represents the best prospect for orderly progress in Iran itself.  He is a 
hyper sensitive man with long memory (which broods upon the British role in 
deposing his father). Any wavering in the support of his friends and allies [UK and 
US] will accordingly have adverse effects on him.” 
  
The Foreign Office also suggested that if any regime from amongst the opposition 
groups active in Iran were to succeed the Shah, “ranging from communist dominated 
revolutionary regime to reactionary Muslim system”, Iran would become “hostile to 
Western interests, as well as probably failing to assert control over the country.”[62] 
Clearly, part of that assessment was correct, but only part. 
  
So, the perceived alternative political scenarios were not in any way welcomed by the 
British Government. Nor indeed were they liked by the US.  The Secretary of State, 
Warren Christopher, is quoted in FCO meetings as saying the US was looking to give 
“psychological and other support” to the Shah whom they regarded as “the only 
vehicle of stability in the country.”[63] Eventually a letter of support was written to 
the Shah from the Prime Minister, James Callaghan, saying that it was sad that “all 
this should happen at a time when your Imperial Majesty’s leadership has been 
moving steadily in the direction of becoming a modern industrial society.”  The Shah 
was encouraged in this letter to hold elections and continue to move forward with his 
“program for progress”.[64] 
  
Clearly, the Shah and his supporters still regarded the BBC as a source of 
revolutionary fervor.  Ambassador Radji’s accounts of meetings in London reveal that 
anger with the BBC was persistent and threatened to get out of hand. According to his 
account, various members of the Iranian Government who wanted to express 
complaints to the BBC were told that the BBC acts independently and when in 
London, they were frequently taken around the BBC to see how the BBC newsroom 
operates and how the Persian broadcasters are translating the news.  The go-betweens 
were trying to persuade Iranian officials that there could be no government pressure 
on the BBC: 
  
“The [Foreign Ministers] session breaks up and David Owen walks up to me 
followed by Khalatbari [Iranian FM], who raises the vexed subject of the 
BBC.  He confesses to be puzzled as to why ‘the BBC is more anxious to 
broadcast the views of the opponents of your friends than the views of your 
friends.’ The Foreign Secretary [David Owen] laughingly says, ‘I agree with 
everything you say, but there isn’t anything I can do about it,’ again insisting 
on the BBC’s independence from the Foreign Office.” [65] 
  
Radji describes how other Iranians of influence were getting together to put pressure 
on the BBC’s Persian Service. FCO documents also reveal the protestation by several 
influential Iranians, such as Seyed Hussein Nasr, head of Queen Farah’s office, and 
the Iranian millionaire, David Allainace. For example, Radji wrote that:  
  
“David Alliance, a successful Iranian businessman, now resident in 
Manchester, comes to tell me that, through his influential contacts in the 
business community in London, he is bringing pressure on to the BBC to tone 
down their Persian broadcasts.” [66] 
  
In a letter to the BBC Board of Governors, another supporter of the Shah, 
Farmanfarmaian, argued that the Persian Service “does not adhere to the British 
standards of fair play” and tabled a five page detailed breakdown of his criticism of 
BBC broadcasts.[67] Professor SH Nasr, “the distinguished Muslim scholar, close to 
the Shahbanou” made a direct complaint to the FCO that even those Iranians who 
were not anti-BBC “resented its interference in Iran’s affairs.”[68] He claimed that 
there was a general belief that “the Persian Service” was acting in furtherance of a 
joint British/Soviet plan to undermine the American position” and that the gesture 
from David Owen was only “part of the act”. He claimed, “The British were canny (it 
was said) enough to know that the best way of discrediting the Shah was to support 
him.”[69] On December 1, 1978 Ambassador Radji wrote to the Foreign Secretary to 
inform him that the BBC representative had been summoned to the Ministry to 
explain his misrepresentation of facts in reporting the money transfers and that his 
expulsion seemed probable.”[70] Andrew Whitley was subsequently expelled from 
Iran.  
  
Thirty years on Whitley says that he was not surprised at the anger of the Shah and his 
supporters. The BBC Persian broadcasts had “a huge impact, everyone heard the 
program, everyone I spoke to anywhere in Tehran and other major cities, listened to 
the BBC”. He admits that he was pro-revolution: “They had justice on their side… I 
personally believed that change was overdue in Iran...However, I was not in anyway 
advocating either for a leftist revolution or for the overthrow of the Shah.” When 
asked whether “the BBC did fan the flames of the revolution?” Whitley says he 
“would not use those words but the BBC did play a role…If it was not for the BBC’s 
broadcasts into the country and its huge listenership I think that the revolution would 
not have proceeded as quickly as it did.”[71]  Whitley felt that: 
  
“The BBC ought to be careful about overstepping the line between reporting 
and being seen as part and parcel of the opposition movement. I don’t believe 
the BBC - as a foreign broadcasting organization - ought to be in a position of 
attempting to change domestic events but I wouldn’t put intent on our side.” 
[72] 





BBC Persian Service had probably never been as popular as it was during the years 
leading to the Iranian revolution of 1979 that led to the formation of the Islamic 
Republic. The reality is that BBC Persian broadcasts took the lead in reporting the 
Iranian revolution of 1979 and both the BBC management and the FCO were taken by 
surprise.  They were caught in the middle. An important element of British foreign 
policy was being played out:  the BBC was communicating closely with Iranians, 
partly through the Persians employed at Bush House. 
  
At the same time, BBC has probably never been seen to be as partial to news as it was 
during those years. A major revolution was in the making and this was not being 
reported anywhere more closely than on the BBC Persian Service. Whitley is 
probably right in stressing there was no intention on the part of the BBC or the FCO 
to have such an impact. A revolution was in full swing in Iran, and the British Foreign 
Office and the Ambassador in Tehran were not fully aware of it. By contrast, the BBC 
Persian broadcasts were representing the emerging voice of the popular 
opposition.  There was almost complete media censorship in Iran in the months of 
leading to the revolution.  By November 1978, Iran had come “within an ace of a total 
collapse of law and order” and the military government had ordered that as a 
temporary measure the local media had to be brought under strict control in order “to 
give the country a chance to calm down.”  As a result “there is virtually no local press 
and the TV and radio is heavily censored.”[73] As a result the only way in which the 
opposition, including Khomeini, the National Front and the religious leadership in 
Iran, could get their message across to their own people was through the BBC Persian 
Service.[74] 
  
In terms of professional journalism, this was a unique opportunity for the BBC World 
Service as a whole and the Persian Service in particular. Their techniques of reporting, 
interviewing, production, and broadcast were under close scrutiny and this could have 
only helped in building better journalism. Yet Whitley is probably right in stressing 
that the BBC must be careful not to overstep “the line between reporting and being 
seen as part and parcel of the opposition movement.” 
  
Amongst the factors that contributed to the overwhelming success in broadcasting 
was the close contact of some of the staff with opposition leaders.  This gave the BBC 
an edge over other media outlets. Moreover, BBC had managed for the first time to 
secure permission for one of its correspondents in Tehran.  Thus audiences hugely 
increased due to these improved technical elements as well as the importance of the 
events that were unfolding.  This in turn enabled a language service hitherto petrified 
in its mould to strengthen its performance by better radio production techniques and 
close up reporting from inside Iran.  It made it possible for the Persian Service to 
justify the necessity of interviewing prominent figures involved in the revolution. 
Perhaps in some small measure editorial checks lapsed on occasion  and some of the 
reports indicate a departure from BBC’s objective balanced style, seeming to be 
mainly based on opposition accounts of events. However, this was not helped by the 
fact that the government in Iran was not providing accurate information.   
  
Events were unfolding so rapidly that there seems to have been debate and 
disagreement inside the FCO too on how to deal with the BBC. The Ambassador in 
Tehran, Sir Anthony Parsons, was most concerned about the survival of the Shah. One 
group inside the Foreign Office believes that the Shah did not have foresight to think 
and plan long term. Another group supported him and felt that the FCO should limit 
the Persian broadcasts to those relating to trade.  However, others saw a more long-
term function for language services and were not convinced at all about closure of the 
service. So there was no consensus inside the FCO on how to deal with the BBC.  The 
Foreign Secretary, David Owen, was clear on his instructions to the FCO not to 
interfere with the BBC but to approach them in a more cordial way.  This was due 
mainly to the ability of the BBC to fight back. The exchanges inside the FCO also 
show reluctance to interfere in case the news of this “got out”.  
  
The elements that make up the complicated web of claims and counterclaims about 
the partiality of the broadcasts pale in relative significance. The original documents of 
the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office reveal that there was no conspiracy on 
the part of the British Government to create a revolution in Iran, far from 
it.  Documents also clearly show that the BBC World Service had by this time become 
far more confident about keeping its independence intact. Despite repeated threats on 
the BBC Persian Service not just from the Shah, the Iranian Ambassador in London 
and powerful industrialist supporters of the Shah in the UK, and despite the repeated 
argument about the so called “British interests in the region”, the BBC Eastern 
Service management seemed in no doubt that neither government – not the Iranian 
and not the British - should interfere in its functioning.  BBC World Service was 
focused on reporting a historical event rather than the diplomatic considerations raised 
by some.  This indicates a powerful evolution in the relationship between the FCO 
and the BBC in favour of the independence of the latter, and a far cry from the days of 
broadcasting in 1941 when the FCO would be writing “the line” for BBC or indeed 
the episode in 1951-53 over the Anglo-Iranian oil crisis. 
  
Despite the fact that again in 1978 British interests - the survival of a trusted British 
ally in the region - were seriously threatened, the BBC management, especially Mark 
Dodd and Gerard Mansell, were confident that BBC’s independence could not be 
undermined. The British Government and the British ambassador in Tehran seem to 
remain firmly behind the Shah of Iran right up to the final days.  Documents up to two 
months prior to the Revolution (those so far available in the National Archives) do not 
indicate any interest on the part of the British Government for a change of leadership 
in Iran. Even the contingency planning of the British Government remained certain 
that there was no alternative group or person that would serve British interests better 
than the Shah. However, the FCO documents relating to the year 1979 – to be 
released in early 2010– may shed new light on British policy in the last two months 
prior to the Iranian revolution. 
  
There are many parallels in this account with the uprising of 2009 and the role of the 
newly-established BBC Persian television: the ‘revolutionary’ regime makes claims 
of interference, of the British wanting to ‘soft topple’ the Islamic Republic and of the 
use of tools of ‘public diplomacy’ such as the British Council and the BBC, to that 
end.  Iranian misunderstanding about the BBC, willful or not, continues as does the 
delicate dance between the FCO and the BBC about supporting British interests or 
being an international broadcaster.  History sheds light on the past, often only to 
reveal the continuities with the present. 
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